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ABSTRACT
This paper tests competing hypotheses on the relationship between 
marginalization and participation in undeclared work. The ‘margin-
alization’ thesis views undeclared work as conducted primarily by 
marginalized populations among which young, unemployed and 
economically fragile people dominate. A competing ‘reinforcement’ 
thesis argues that undeclared work is conducted disproportionately 
by those in declared jobs and thus that the undeclared economy 
reinforces, rather than reduces, the inequalities produced by the 
declared economy. To evaluate who engages in undeclared work 
and to test these competing theses, data is reported from a 2015 
survey of 6,021 randomly selected adult respondents in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Reporting the marginal effects of a Probit regression 
analysis, the finding is that marginalized groups (the unemployed, 
younger age groups, those with fewer years in formal education, 
lower-income households, rural populations and those from poorer 
regions) are all significantly more likely to participate in undeclared 
work. The implications for theory and policy are discussed, along with 
the limitations of the study and future research required.
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Introduction
This paper is focused on undeclared work, which refers to paid activities not declared to the 
authorities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes when they should be declared 
(European Commission 2014; OECD 2012; Schneider 2013; Williams 2014; Williams and 
Windebank 1998). For several decades, the dominant view has been that undeclared work 
exists in the margins, disproportionately conducted by populations living in marginalized 
areas, such as less affluent regions and peripheral rural areas (ILO 2018), and by margin-
alized socio-demographic and socio-economic groups, such as women, unemployed peo-
ple, the less educated and those in financial difficulty (Brill 2011; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013). 
Nevertheless, this is more often an assumption than an evidence-based finding. 
A competing ‘reinforcement’ thesis argues that undeclared work is conducted dispropor-
tionately by those in declared jobs and thus that the undeclared economy reinforces, rather 
than reduces, the inequalities produced by the declared economy. Thus, the aim of this 
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paper is to evaluate the validity of the ‘marginalization’ versus its competing ‘reinforcement’ 
thesis to advance the evidence-based understanding of who engages in undeclared work. To 
do this, 2015 survey data is reported of 6,021 randomly selected respondents aged between 
16 and 65 years old in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Therefore, knowledge about undeclared work is advanced in several distinct ways. 
Theoretically, by evaluating who engages in undeclared work, this paper provides an 
evidence-based evaluation of the marginalization thesis by examining whether important 
causal factors of marginalization such as gender, age, education, and employment status, 
influence participation in undeclared work. Empirically, meanwhile, this paper provides 
one of the first evaluations of the characteristics of the undeclared labour force in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The size of undeclared economy in this country is estimated to be 
around 30% of GDP (Pasovic and Efendic 2018), with indications that both (formally) 
employed and unemployed individuals engage in undeclared economy, as well as that 
differences in age, gender and regions might drive greater participation in undeclared 
economy (A. Efendic and Williams 2018; Williams and Efendic 2020). Such a sample 
provides a fertile ground for investigation of the ‘marginalization’ versus ‘reinforcement’ 
theses, which remains scientifically unexplored. Thus, in terms of policy implications, 
this paper advances understanding by identifying the populations to be targeted and 
reviews the various policy approaches that might be adopted by policy makers.
In the next section, therefore, a brief review is undertaken of the competing theoriza-
tions of those who participate in undeclared work. This will reveal that although the 
dominant view is that marginalized populations are more likely to participate in unde-
clared work, the advent of agency-oriented explanations, which view such endeavours as 
conducted out of choice rather than necessity, has led to this being questioned. To 
evaluate the validity of these competing theorizations, the third section introduces 
a representative survey of randomly selected respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
used to conduct this research, whilst the fourth section reports the results. Finding that 
nearly all marginalized groups are significantly more likely to participate in undeclared 
work is reported in the following section, while the penultimate section contains robust-
ness check of the reported results. The final section concludes by discussing the theore-
tical and policy implications, along with the limitations of this study and future research 
required.
Literature review
In recent decades, undeclared work has attracted interest from policymakers and aca-
demics because it has been recognized as persistent and extensive, even in developed 
economies (see Williams 2019; Williams and Schneider 2016). One of the most heated 
current debates in this literature is over who participates in the undeclared economy. On 
the one hand, a ‘marginalization’ thesis views undeclared work as conducted by margin-
alized populations. On the other hand, a ‘reinforcement’ thesis asserts that undeclared 
work is conducted disproportionately by those benefiting most from declared work and 
that undeclared work therefore reinforces, rather than reduces, the disparities produced 
by declared work.
Take, for example, the unemployed. The marginalization thesis asserts that the 
unemployed are disproportionately engaged in undeclared work due to their exclusion 
2 C. C. WILLIAMS AND A. EFENDIC
from the declared labour market (Ahmad 2008; Castree et al. 2004; Katungi et al. 2006; 
Rubić 2013; Sasunkevich 2014; Surdej and Ślęzak 2009). Undeclared work is seen to 
provide the unemployed with a hidden means of livelihood and in doing so, to offset the 
disparities produced by the declared economy. This belief that undeclared work is 
disproportionately conducted by the unemployed, however, is more an a priori assump-
tion rather than an evidence-based finding. Indeed, the evidence supporting this asser-
tion derives from small-scale studies of particular populations in Belfast (Leonard 1994), 
Brussels (Kesteloot and Meert 1999) and Romania (Stănculescu 2005).
Over the past few decades, a reinforcement thesis has emerged arguing the inverse, 
namely that undeclared work is disproportionately undertaken by those in declared jobs 
and thus that the undeclared economy reinforces, rather than reduces, the inequalities 
produced by the declared economy (Kaitedlidou et al. 2011; MacDonald 1994; Moldovan 
and Van de Walle 2013; Pfau-Effinger and Sakač Magdalenić 2009). Again, the evidence 
supporting this thesis has been small-scale studies based on small samples. These are 
largely studies of individual western European countries (Foudi et al. 1982; Pahl 1984; 
Pfau-Effinger and Sakač Magdalenić 2009; Van Geuns et al. 1987; Williams 2001, 2004; 
Williams and Windebank 2001) and north European nations (Krumplyte and 
Samulevicius 2010; Persson and Malmer 2006). Pedersen (2003), for example, identifies 
that the unemployed constitute only a small proportion of the undeclared workforce: 
20.7% in Germany, 9.9% in Denmark and 9.2% in the UK.
When examining who participates in undeclared work, this debate between the 
marginalization and reinforcement theses has extended well beyond the employment 
status of participants. Similar debates have occurred around spatial variables. The 
marginalization thesis has asserted that participation in undeclared work is greater in 
less affluent global regions (ILO 2012; Williams 2013), poorer countries (Schneider 2013; 
Schneider and Williams 2013; Williams 2015), less wealthy regions (Kesteltoot and Meert 
1999; Williams and Windebank 2001) and more prevalent in peripheral rural areas than 
urban areas (Button 1984; Williams 2010, 2011). A similar view exists when examining 
socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Women are asserted to be more 
likely to participate in undeclared work than men (ILO 2013; Leonard 1994, 1998; 
Stănculescu 2005), as are the less educated (Brill 2011; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013), and 
those with greater financial difficulties (Barbour and Llanes 2013; Katungi et al. 2006; 
Williams 2004).
This marginalization thesis that participation in undeclared work is concentrated in 
marginalized populations emerges out of, and is a central tenet of, two dominant 
theorizations of undeclared work. In modernization theory, undeclared work is 
a leftover from a previous mode of production and prevails in marginal enclaves not 
yet subjected to modernization and economic development (La Porta and Shleifer 
2008, 2014). In political economy theory, undeclared work is a direct by-product of 
a deregulated open world economy (Castells and Portes 1989; Davis 2006; Meagher 
2010; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013). The decline in social protection and economic 
intervention accompanying de-regulation are viewed as resulting in those excluded 
from the declared economy and social protection being pushed into undeclared work 
as a means of survival (ILO 2014; Meagher 2010; Taiwo 2013). Undeclared work in 
political economy theory is therefore viewed as ‘necessity-driven’ endeavour con-
ducted by marginalized populations excluded from the declared labour market and 
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social protection systems (Castells and Portes 1989; Gallin 2001; Williams and Round 
2010).
However, this dominant marginalization thesis has been contested. Based on the 
view that necessity is not the only factor driving populations into undeclared work, 
it has been argued that it is not always marginalized populations who engage in 
undeclared work. Indeed, several studies reveal that undeclared work is more 
prevalent in affluent regions and localities (Evans et al. 2006; van Geuns et al. 
1987; Williams 2004; Williams and Windebank 2001), those in declared jobs 
(MacDonald 1994; Pahl 1984; Renooy 1990; Williams 2001), among men (Lemieux 
et al. 1994; McInnis-Dittrich 1995) and those without financial difficulties (Williams 
2004; Williams et al. 2013).
This reinforcement thesis arises out of two agency-oriented theorizations. On the 
one hand, a rational economic actor perspective has depicted undeclared workers as 
participating in undeclared work when the benefits outweigh the costs. From this 
perspective, burdensome regulations, high taxes and corruption among public sector 
officials increase the costs of declared work and lead people to voluntarily exit the 
declared economy and operate in the undeclared economy (De Soto 1989, 2001; 
Nwabuzor 2005). On the other hand, and based on institutional theory (North 
1990), another agency-oriented theory adopts a ‘social actor’ approach. Undeclared 
work is viewed as illegal but socially legitimate activity that exists when the formal 
institutions are not in symmetry with the norms, values and beliefs that constitute 
the informal institutions (De Castro et al. 2014; Kistruck et al. 2015; Siqueira et al. 
2016; Thai and Turkina 2014; Webb et al. 2009, 2013, 2014). When symmetry exists 
between formal and informal institutions, undeclared work only occurs uninten-
tionally, such as due to a lack of understanding of the laws and regulations. 
However, when institutional asymmetry exists, the result is undeclared work. 
Indeed, the higher the asymmetry, the greater the level of undeclared work 
(Williams and Shahid 2016).
Given these two apparently mutually exclusive viewpoints on who engages in unde-
clared work, especially in the Western Balkans, the aim of this paper is to provide an 
evidence-based evaluation of the marginalization thesis by testing the following 
hypotheses:
Employment marginalization hypothesis 
H1: The non-employed are more likely to participate in undeclared work than the 
employed.
Individual socio-demographic marginalization hypotheses 
H2a: Women are more likely to participate in undeclared work than men.
H2b: Younger age groups are more likely to participate in undeclared work than older 
age groups.
H2c: Those with fewer years in formal education are more likely to participate in 
undeclared work than those spending longer in formal education.
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Household socio-economic marginalization hypotheses 
H3a: Those in lower-income households are more likely to participate in undeclared 
work than those in higher income households
H3b: Households with children are more likely to participate in informal work than 
households with no children.
Spatial marginalization hypothesis 
H4: Those living in rural areas are more likely to participate in undeclared work than 
those living in urban areas. H4b: Those living in less affluent regions are more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than those living in more affluent regions.
H4c: Undeclared work will be lower when there is greater trust in government.
Until now, there has been scarce scientific evidence on participation in undeclared 
work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the one hand, reliance on informal institutions (A. 
Efendic et al. 2011) and the use of informal networking are viewed as widespread 
practices in this region (Ledeneva and Efendic 2021). All these informal practices under-
pin participation in undeclared work (Gordy and Efendic, 2019), which is indeed 
identified to be high and associated with substantial direct and indirect costs for the 
participants (A. Efendic and Ledeneva 2020). The size of the undeclared economy is 
estimated at 30% of GDP (Pasovic and Efendic 2018), while over 20% of the labour force 
is found to participate in the undeclared economy (Williams and Efendic 2020). On the 
other hand, what is the systematic pattern in undeclared economy participation remains 
unexplored. To fill this gap, our research provides empirical evidence based on a large 
survey, explained in the following section.
Data, variables and method
Data
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with around 3.5 million people (2013 census), 
a postwar society (Bosnian war 1992–1995), a transition economy and a Western Balkans 
state that aspires to become part of the European Union (EU potential candidate). 
Institutionally, it is composed of two entities, Federation BiH (FBiH), Republika Srspka 
(RSBiH), and one district, the District Brcko of BiH (DBBiH), including a cantonal level 
in FBiH (10 cantons) and municipal level in both entities. Such a diversified structure and 
institutional complexity is associated with often inefficient formal institutions, low trust 
in governments at different levels as well as a substitutive reliance on informal institu-
tions and practices (A. Efendic et al. 2011).
The economic performance of BiH in recent pre-Covid-19 pandemic years has been 
characterized by modest economic growth which moved around 3% annually (CBBiH 
2019), a high but decreasing unemployment rate which was around 16% in 2019 
(SEEJGD 2020). Moreover, there has been a rather significant decline (over 10%) of the 
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working-age population over the last decade, caused to a large extent by a high negative 
net migration balance estimated to be around 13% of the population (Leitner 2021). 
There are quite significant external-sector imbalances (trade deficit over 20% of gross 
domestic product), which have fortunately been partly compensated for by a substantial 
amount of remittances of around 10% of GDP (CBBiH 2019). While indicators that 
capture the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic are still not fully available, there is enough 
indication to conclude that the performance at the labour market level is getting worse, 
economic outcomes of the business sector have diminished, while economic growth of 
the country was negative in 2020. What was happening in the undeclared economy 
during the pandemic time is certainly a topic for some future research.
The main characteristics of the labour market in BiH are a very low activity rate, which 
is about half of the EU average (around 40%), and high unemployment rates, especially 
for young people. According to the SEEJGD (2020), the labour force participation rate 
(aged 15+) was only 44% of the working-age population in 2015 (the year when the 
survey for this research was implemented). Similarly, the employment rate is also very 
low (32% in 2015), with unemployment being 28% in 2015. These data correspond very 
well to the survey data which we use later to investigate determinants of undeclared work 
participation.
To evaluate the relationship between different categories of population and 
participation in undeclared work, data are reported from 6,021 interviews con-
ducted in 2015 by a professional market research agency with respondents aged 
between 16 and 65 years old in Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 The interviews were 
conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). The survey 
sample involved selection at 40 participants from each municipality so that the 
total number from all municipalities would be 6,000. The participants in each 
municipality were randomly selected using the closest birthday rule. On first 
contact, the interviewers asked about the number of persons living in the apart-
ment or house in the specified age range. The interviewers then conducted the 
interview with the household member whose birthday was closest to the date they 
are interviewing. If that person was not at home, a call back was arranged. Five 
call backs occurred before omitting that telephone number. This ensured 
a random selection of respondents stratified by municipality. The final dataset 
comprised on average 44 interviews per municipality, with a minimum of 40 and 
a maximum of 46. Such data provide a high-quality representative sample of BiH 
population that can be used to assess the general performance of the declared and 
undeclared labour market in this country. Moreover, the dataset contains popula-
tion weight indicators which are used to investigate if the results differ between 
the weighted and non-weighted data.
Variables
The dependent variable on participation in undeclared work derives from the 
question: ‘Do you have some informal job(s) or activities which bring you some 
income?’. Those answering ‘yes’ are defined as undeclared workers, which corre-
sponds very well to the definition of undeclared work presented in the introductory 
section. The dependent variable for the regression analysis, undeclwork, therefore 
6 C. C. WILLIAMS AND A. EFENDIC
relates to those who participate in undeclared work, including those who report only 
undeclared work but also those who have additionally a declared job but report 
some undeclared income and activities (i.e., their share is 7% in the full sample). 
Since we are testing the competing ‘marginalization’ versus ‘reinforcement’ hypoth-
eses, such a sample nicely fits the research focus.
The control variables used, meanwhile, are related to those characteristics that pre-
vious studies reveal are associated with participation in undeclared work (Williams and 
Horodnic 2017a). These include:
● Individual socio-demographic determinants – typical indicators linked to respon-
dents, such as age, gender, the level of education;
● Household socio-economic determinants – include indicators linked to household 
size and income;
● Spatial determinants – whether respondents live in a rural or urban/suburban areas, 
if they live in more or less affluent regions, and the level of trust in institutions for 
the administrative structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for the municipalities 
at the lowest administrative level.
The variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 1 along with a short explanation.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used for empirical modelling.








undeclwork Undeclared job or income: 1 = yes; 0 = no 5,992 0.335 0.472 0.5%
Individual characteristics
male Gender: 1 = male; 0 = female 6,021 0.452 0.498 0.0%
age Age of respondents: from 16 to 65 6,021 47.158 14.892 0.0%
noeducat Education: 1 = no education; 0 = other 6,021 0.055 0.229 0.0%
primary_ed Education: 1 = primary education; 0 = other 6,021 0.233 0.422 0.0%
second_ed Education: 1 = secondary; 0 = other 6,021 0.543 0.498 0.0%
high_ed Education: 1 = higher education; 0 = other 6,021 0.165 0.371 0.0%
dontknow_ed Education: 1 = don’t know; 0 = other 6,021 0.005 0.068 0.0%
Socio-economic characteristics
nochild Number of children: from 0 to 11 5,989 1.679 1.311 0.5%
low_income Household income: 1 = 0 to 150 Euro; 0 = other 6,021 0.180 0.384 0.0%
med_income Household income: 1 = 151–350 Euro; 0 = other 6,021 0.306 0.461 0.0%
high_income Household income: 1 = 351- . . . Euro; 0 = other 6,021 0.362 0.481 0.0%
inc_dknw Household income: 1 = don’t know; 0 = other 6,021 0.237 0.425 0.0%
Spatial characteristics
rural Survey area: 1 = rural; 0 = urban, suburban 6,021 0.484 0.500 0.0%
fbih Region: 1 = Federation BiH entity; 0 = other 6,021 0.573 0.495 0.0%
rsbih Region: 1 = Republika Srpska entity; 0 = other 6,021 0.420 0.494 0.0%
dbbih Region: 1 = Brcko District of BiH; 0 = other 6,021 0.008 0.087 0.0%
stategov Confidence in State government; 1 min to 5 max 5,335 1.665 1.075 11.4%
entgov Confidence in Entity government; 1 min to 5 max 5,305 1.677 1.090 11.9%
locgov Confidence in Local government; 1 min to 5 max 5,316 1.739 1.147 11.7%
mnpc Municipality code: from 1 to 143 6,021 73.259 41.409 0.0%
Other controls used in robustness checking
wealth Wealth proxy: (having savings, house, insurance, car, computer); 
range 0 nothing to 1 all of it.
5,700 0.462 0.242 5.3%
unemployed Respondents is looking for a job; 0- no, 1-yes 6,001 0.207 0.405 0.3%
femploy Respondents reporting formal job; 0- no, 1-yes 6,004 0.272 0.445 0.3%
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Analytical method
The purpose of our empirical investigation is to evaluate the socio-demographic, socio- 
economic and spatial characteristics of those engaged in undeclared work to test the 
above-stated hypotheses. To do so, a probability empirical model (Probit) has been used 
as it fits the data (it is a binary response to the main question of interest – if respondents 
participate in undeclared work or not). This empirical strategy gives us the possibility of 
testing whether individual, socio-economic and spatial characteristics affect the prob-
ability of participation in undeclared work. Cluster robust standard errors are estimated 
with municipalities as clusters. Such an estimation strategy adopts a conservative 
approach to inference (A. Efendic and Pugh 2018). Our fully specified model can be 
written in the form of the following equation: 
P UNDECLWORK ¼ 1 if LABFORCE ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ Λðβ0þ
β̂1�MALE þ β̂2�AGE þ β̂3�NOEDUCAT þ β̂4PRIMARY ED þ β̂5�SECOND ED
þ β̂6�NOCHILD þ β̂7�LOW INCOME þ β̂8�MED INCOME þ β̂9RURAL þ β̂10�FBIH
þ β̂11�RSBIH þ β̂12�STATEGOV þ β̂13�ENTGOV þ β̂14�LOCGOVÞ þ ε̂
(1) 
The variables are explained in Table 1, including some additional controls used as part of 
our robustness checking. P refers to Probit estimation, Λ signifies a function of indepen-
dent variables, β̂0 14 are coefficients to be estimated and ε̂ is the model error term. The 
variable labforce is used to estimate the model only for the subsample of labour force 
participants, i.e., those who are employed or looking for a job (around 45%), as the 
remaining working-age population is out of the labour force (around 55% of the sample). 
Such a distribution of the sample quite nicely captures the activity rate of working-age 
population which was 44.1% in 2015 (SEEJGD 2020). We do not report the Probit- 
estimated coefficients as they do not provide a directly useful quantification of the 
estimated relationships (these are available on request). We obtain the most interesting 
information for interpretation by looking at the marginal effects, which are estimated and 
reported in Table 3.
Findings
To evaluate H1 regarding whether the unemployed are more likely to engage in unde-
clared work than those employed, we start with descriptive statistics. The finding 
(reported in Table 1) is that 33% of the representative sample of respondents surveyed 
engaged in undeclared work. Some 7% of all respondents engage in undeclared work in 
addition to their regular declared job and 26% of all respondents receive their income 
only from undeclared work. Given that only 27% of all respondents have a declared job, 
undeclared work is far from an activity existing only in the margins of the labour market 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. More respondents (33%) engage in undeclared work and 
activity than in declared work (27%), and of all in declared work, close to 30% also engage 
in undeclared work. As such, over one-quarter of all workers receive their income solely 
from undeclared work and over one-third of all workers receive income from undeclared 
work in addition to their declared work. For over three-quarters of undeclared workers, 
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therefore, their income from undeclared work is their only source of income from 
employment. This data supports hypothesis H1 that the non-employed are more likely 
to participate in undeclared work than those employed. However, a more detailed 
investigation of this hypothesis will be done in the empirical model that we elaborate 
later as part of our robustness analysis.
Table 2. Distribution of undeclared workers.
AGE GENDER URBAN/RURAL REGION
% BiH Young (16–35) Old (35+) Male Female Urban Suburb Rural FBiH RS BD
NO 74 72 74 71 76 80 76 69 75 72 74
YES 26 28 26 29 24 20 24 31 25 28 26
Source: Authors. Note, these data do not include individuals having formal jobs and undeclared income simultaneously 
(around 7% of the sample). Descriptive statistics of variable undeclwork in Table 1, includes additionally those with 
formal jobs and who report some undeclared income as well.
Table 3. Probability of engaging in undeclared work: marginal effects (cluster robust standard errors 
with municipalities as cluster, population weighted results).





ME2 – individual 
and household 
factors
M3 – all factors 
BASE MODEL
M4 – BASE MODEL with 
municipal fixed effects
M5 – BASE MODEL 
with only undeclared 
work
male 0.166*** 0.175*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.0526**
(0.0245) (0.0253) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0248)
age −0.00212* −0.00340*** −0.00276* −0.00276* −0.00442***
(0.00108) (0.00123) (0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00125)
noeducation 0.381*** 0.289* 0.291* 0.291* 0.166
(0.141) (0.153) (0.164) (0.164) (0.107)
primary_ed 0.119*** 0.0642 0.00529 0.00529 0.0861**
(0.0425) (0.0433) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0436)
second_ed 0.0613* 0.0350 0.0225 0.0225 0.0962***
(0.0334) (0.0330) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0284)
nochild 0.0230** 0.0189 0.0189 0.00606
(0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0115)
low_income 0.135*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.232***
(0.0350) (0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0301)
med_income 0.0147 0.0127 0.0127 0.0982***
(0.0255) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0269)
rural 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0522**
(0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0237)
fbih 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.0181
(0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0145)
rsbih 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.0430***
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0123)
stategov 0.0382 0.0382 0.0273
(0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0238)
entgov −0.0320 −0.0320 0.0180
(0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0249)
locgov −0.0134 −0.0134 −0.0521***
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0166)
Observations 2,703 2,689 2,514 2,514 2,512
dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The omitted categories in the model: 
- for education is the higher education (higher_ed); 
- for household income the highest level of income (high_income) 
Note, the estimated coefficients for ‘do not know’ responses for education and income variables are not reported for 
reasons of space, but they are used in the model. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using STATA 14 (STATA 14, StataCorp, Texas, USA).
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Examining these 26% of the respondents who receive their income solely from 
undeclared work, Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on their characteristics. 
This reveals that younger people are slightly more likely to engage in undeclared work 
than older people, and men are more likely than women to engage in undeclared work. It 
is also the case that those living in rural areas are markedly more likely to engage in 
undeclared work than those living in urban areas, and that those living in the less 
economically developed regions (RSBiH) of the country are more likely to engage in 
undeclared work than those in the more affluent regions (FBiH and DBBiH). These 
descriptive findings, therefore, appear to support the marginalization thesis, which we 
explore further through our probability models.
To evaluate whether the marginalization thesis remains valid when other variables are 
held constant and controlled for Table 3 presents the marginal effects that result from 
a Probit regression analysis. Model 1 reports the marginal effects of individual character-
istics only, while Model 2 reports that this model is extended with household socio- 
economic determinants. Model 3 is our baseline model that we interpret below, and it 
includes additional spatial determinants. Model 4 reports our baseline model is extended 
with municipal-fixed effects, while Model 5 reports the unweighted results, as all previous 
models are reported with population weights and cluster robust standard errors. It is 
important to note the stability of the key results across these different models.
Here, the results on the relationship between participation in undeclared work and 
relevant individual, household socio-economic and spatial variables (Table 3, Model 3) 
suggest that participation in undeclared work is significantly associated with gender. Men 
(male) are significantly more likely (17%) to engage in undeclared work compared with 
women. This refutes hypothesis H2a. Women are not more likely to engage in undeclared 
work compared with men. This is perhaps a result of the weakness of the declared labour 
market in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which women generally participate to a lower 
extent. Moreover, such a finding has been confirmed by in-depth regional research 
conducted as part of the INFORM project.2 It has been reported that, traditionally, 
women in the undeclared economy rely on ‘gender defined jobs’ to support the family 
budget, including examples such as caring for elderly people and children, renting spare 
rooms, cleaning, and similar, but overall, there are more male participants in the 
undeclared economy (N. Efendic et al. 2018). Participation in undeclared work is also 
significantly associated with age (age). Younger groups are more likely to engage in 
undeclared work. Indeed, an increase in age by 1 year (between the ages of 16 and 65) 
reduces the probability of engaging in undeclared work by 0.3%. This confirms hypoth-
esis H2b. Younger age groups are more likely to participate in undeclared work than older 
age groups.
Turning to the years in formal education, it is again the case that there is 
a significant association with participation in undeclared work. An additional level 
of education systematically decreases participation in undeclared work. For example, 
there is 29% higher probability of participation in undeclared work by individuals 
who did not complete their primary education compared with those with university 
degrees, and with a fully consistent pattern – lower education is associated with 
higher participation in undeclared work. This confirms hypothesis H2c. Those with 
fewer years of formal education are more likely to participate in undeclared work 
than those spending longer in formal education. However, there is no relationship 
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between whether children are present in the household and participation in unde-
clared work (refuting hypothesis H2d).
Examining trust in government, which the now dominant institutional theory has 
used to explain participation in undeclared work, the finding of this study is that there is 
a significant correlation. Undeclared work is less likely when there is greater trust in 
government (confirming hypothesis H2e). However, given the very specific and unique 
structure of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where local governments have 
considerable autonomy and power relative to national and regional level authorities, 
this is relevant only at the local government level, which suggests the importance of local 
governments when tackling undeclared work in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Analysing the socio-economic characteristics of the households within which workers 
live, a strong significant association exists between household income and participation 
in undeclared work. As household income increases, participation in undeclared work is 
less likely. For example, there is 26% higher probability of participation in undeclared 
work by individuals coming from households who have no regular income. This con-
firms hypothesis H3a. Those in lower-income households are more likely to participate in 
undeclared work than those in higher income household.
However, there is no relationship between the size of households measured through 
the number of children present in the household and participation in undeclared work 
(we do not have enough evidence to confirm H3b).
Turning to the influence of spatial characteristics, the first finding is that those living 
in rural areas are more likely to participate in undeclared work than those living in 
urban/suburban areas (suggesting that we cannot reject H4a). There is a 9% higher 
participation in undeclared work by rural respondents (rural) compared with those 
from urban or suburban areas. This reinforces previous studies that highlight the higher 
participation in undeclared work in rural areas (Williams 2011; Williams and Horodnic 
2017b). The second finding is that those living in less affluent regions are more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than those living in wealthier regions (the evidence 
supports H4b). There is a higher probability of participation in undeclared work in the 
Republika Srpska entity (rsbih) compared to the Federation of BiH (fbih) or District 
Brcko of BiH (dbbih), which are economically more developed regions.3
Examining trust in government, which the now dominant institutional theory has 
used to explain participation in undeclared work, the finding of this study is that there is 
no significant association. Undeclared work is less likely when there is greater trust in the 
government (hypothesis H4c), which in our case is not confirmed (insignificant influence 
of variables: stategov, entgov and locgov). However, given the very specific and unique 
structure of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina briefly discussed earlier, as well as 
very low trust to all institutions, with not so much variation between different govern-
ment levels, this result is not surprising.
Robustness check of the main results
As part of robustness checks, more estimations have been conducted which are available 
in Table 3 or on request. First, a baseline model is run that controls for the effect of 
municipalities (Table 3, Model 4) in which all 143 municipal dummies are included in the 
model (mnpc). This estimate takes into account the fixed effects coming from 
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municipalities in the sample, which means that this model is estimated with over 150 
variables and with more information. However, there is no difference with the baseline 
model results suggesting stability of the main finding to this change in specification. The 
same conclusion is arrived at when non-weighted data (Table 3, Model 5) is used, 
confirming the stability of the model to this change and a gain in the statistical sig-
nificance of a variable measuring the size of households (nochild).
The next step was to explore further the effect of unemployment status in the model 
(and H1 hypothesis), which has a statistically significant influence if added to the initial 
models (Models 1–2) or the baseline model (Model 3). However, the problem of includ-
ing (un)employment status raises conceptual and statistical problems linked to potential 
endogeneity. Conceptually, both employment and unemployment status are typically 
explained by age and education, which are indeed significant variables in a Probit model 
(Equation 1) that explains either employment or unemployment status of respondents as 
the dependent variable. Thus, when unemployment status is included into the base 
model (unemployed), these variables lose their significance confirming potential endo-
geneity, and implying that these influences might work through the employment status. 
It is the same conclusion if employment status is included (i.e., formal employment, 
femploy) in the model. Intuitively discussed, the effect of unemployment is statistically 
significant in all these at around 25% (a probability of higher participation in undeclared 
work by unemployed). While such results are aligned with the H1 hypothesis, the belief is 
that this variable should not be part of the baseline specification; this is linked to the 
potential endogeneity of this variable and the limitations to work on this issue more in 
cross-sectional data. The same conclusion exists for formal employment status that also 
has a statistically significant effect, suggesting a lower participation of those having 
formal jobs in undeclared work by 34%, and again supporting marginalization arguments 
and H1 hypothesis.
Additionally, included has been a variable proxying wealth (wealth) of respondents (if 
respondents report having savings + house + insurance + car + computer) to the baseline 
model (Model 3), but it does not come with a statistically significant influence. Thus, 
there is inconclusive evidence. However, this proxy variable does not necessarily capture 
differences between respondents in absolute wealth, which is probably more important 
for the model, as having a house in different regions or areas (e.g., urban versus rural) is 
structurally different in the context of its real value. Moreover, the amount of 
savings between different respondents who report it is not known. Thus, more data is 
needed to check the wealth influence on the ‘marginalization’ or ‘reinforcement’ hypoth-
esis with more confidence. Consequently, it is omitted from the baseline model although 
the main findings with this extension do not change; the same variables are statistically 
significant, with the same estimated signs and almost fully equal effects. The baseline 
model is robust to this addition.
Under the estimation strategy, labour force participants have been used to exclude 
those not participating in the labour market. However, when a model is run with the full 
sample of the data, again, generally consistent results are obtained with the key conclu-
sions and it is here reported as an additional robustness check of the model.
Finally, following Williams and Efendic (2020), a model is run with undeclared 
participants only, i.e., those who have a formal job and also report some undeclared 
activities are excluded. This sample does not fit the intention to explore from 
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a comparative perspective the ‘marginalization’ versus ‘reinforcement’ hypothesis,4 but it 
still provides a fully consistent story of the main findings (with some differences in the 
magnitude of estimated effects), including a gain in statistical significance of a variable 
controlling for the effect of institutional trust. Precisely, trust in local government has 
a statistically significant effect, suggesting that a higher trust in local institutions is 
associated with lower participation in undeclared work, supporting our H4c hypothesis: 
Undeclared work will be lower when there is greater trust in government. However, the 
sample used fits better the research focus of this article.
Conclusions
To evaluate the marginalization thesis which asserts that marginalized populations 
are more likely to participate in undeclared work, this paper has analysed data from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the marginal effects from a Probit regression analysis. 
This reveals that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, participation in undeclared work is 
higher among the unemployed, younger age groups, those with fewer years in 
formal education, lower-income households, rural populations and those in poorer 
regions. However, men are found to be significantly more likely to engage in 
undeclared work than women, while we obtain inconclusive results for the effect 
of institutional trust.
Theoretically, the implication is that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the marginalization 
thesis is valid. Marginalized groups (the unemployed, younger age groups, those with 
fewer years of formal education, lower-income households, rural populations and 
poorer regions) are significantly more likely to participate in undeclared work. The 
only exception are women who are significantly less likely to participate in undeclared 
work compared with men. This suggests that the ‘reinforcement’ thesis is not valid in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no evidence that undeclared work is conducted 
disproportionately by those benefiting most from declared work and that undeclared 
work therefore reinforces, rather than reduces, the disparities produced by declared 
work. A further important finding, given the emergence of institutional theory as an 
explanation for participation in undeclared work (Webb et al. 2009, 2013; Williams and 
Horodnic 2017a, 2017b), is that those who lack trust in the state (in the form of local 
governments), are significantly more likely to engage in undeclared work. It appears 
that when there is a lack of vertical trust (i.e., trust of citizens in the state), the greater is 
the probability of engaging in undeclared work. However, this finding has been 
identified for the sample of those who participate in undeclared work only, but not 
when the sample is extended to those who have both formal jobs and report some 
undeclared activities. Such a result provides the opportunity for further research on the 
reasons for these differences.
Turning to the policy implications, these results display the specific spaces and 
populations that need to be targeted when tackling undeclared work. This paper 
reveals that the current targeting of the unemployed when tackling undeclared work 
is not a mistake. The unemployed are significantly more likely to participate in 
undeclared work. Policy initiatives seeking to smooth the transition from unemploy-
ment to self-employment are therefore worthwhile. It also reveals that it is appro-
priate to target marginal populations when tackling undeclared work, including 
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younger age groups, the less educated, rural populations and the less affluent 
regions. This analysis, in other words, provides a useful risk assessment of the 
different populations to enable an evaluation of the validity of the currently targeted 
populations. It also reveals that improving vertical trust among these populations is 
necessary if undeclared work is to be tackled.
Vertical trust, which refers to the low trust of citizens in government, seen 
through the lens of institutional theory, reflects the asymmetry between the laws, 
codes and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, beliefs and values of 
informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; North 1990). To address low 
vertical trust, this non-alignment needs to be resolved. On the one hand, govern-
ments can seek to alter values, norms and beliefs regarding the acceptability of 
participating in undeclared work. Raising awareness about the benefits of declared 
work, for example, by revealing how taxes result in better public goods and services, 
is one option to elicit an intrinsic motivation to comply. Initiatives might include 
providing citizens with better information on how taxes are spent and use ‘your 
taxes are paying for this’ signs on ambulances, fire engines, in hospitals, and on 
construction projects built with public funds. This analysis reveals marginalized 
groups who could be targeted by such campaigns (e.g., rural populations, younger 
age groups, the less educated), but in particular, those who rely only on income 
coming from undeclared work.
On the other hand, greater vertical trust requires changes in the formal institu-
tions. Past studies in other countries reveal compliance increases with improved 
procedural justice, which refers to citizens perceiving state authorities to treat them 
in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Murphy 2005), procedural fair-
ness, which refers to citizens believing they pay their fair share compared with 
others (Molero and Pujol 2012) and redistributive justice, which refers to citizens 
believing they receive the public goods and services deserved for the taxes paid 
(Kirchgässner 2011). This study reveals that applying these principles to the mod-
ernization of local government in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a useful way 
forward.
There are, nevertheless, limitations to this study. The finding that the margin-
alization thesis is valid is for only one country. What is now required is to evaluate 
whether the findings are similar when examining other countries using a similar 
methodology. This future research might also examine the motives for engaging in 
undeclared work, including the specific institutions in which there is a lack of trust 
by those participating in undeclared work only versus those who participate in both 
declared and undeclared work simultaneously, so that the institutions in need of 
modernization can be identified.
In summary, this paper has revealed the validity of the marginalization thesis when 
explaining who engages in undeclared work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If this paper thus 
stimulates the pursuit of a similar evidence-based approach in other global regions and 
nations, especially other transition economies, or postwar societies, then it will have 
fulfilled one of its intentions. If this paper also encourages a deeper investigation of the 
policy implications, not least in terms of the populations targeted by the authorities, and 
greater exploration of how to build vertical trust among these marginalized groups, then 
it will have fulfilled its wider intention.
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Notes
1. In the first place, the survey was conducted to support the project ‘Social capital and 
migration – evidence from post-conflict environment’, which aimed to explore how 
different dimensions of social capital interact with diverse migration categories of indivi-
duals. More on this project and the data are available at: https://dass.credi.ba/2020/10/15/ 
social-capital-and-migration-evidence-from-post-conflict-environment/. The project was 
supported by University of Fribourg, Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern 
Europe, Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans – RRPP.
2. INFORM project ‘Closing the gap between formal and informal institutions in the Balkans’ 
is a EU Horizon 2020 multidisciplinary research focused on formal and informal institu-
tions in the Balkans. The survey was conducted in all Western Balkan countries in 2017 by 
a professional research agency. More about the project and related findings is available at: 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/research/funded-research-projects/inform.
3. If we take the relative share of these regions in Gross Domestic Product of BiH taking into 
account the population size of these regions.
4. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the relevant sample for empirical use.
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